Post by Stingray on Apr 7, 2008 17:37:03 GMT -4
No Iraqi aircraft carrying the SPS-141MVG pod was ever shot down by the Iranians, whether Ground defence system (HAWK Missiles) or Radar guided air to air (Sparrow and Phoenix Missiles) during the entire Iraq –Iran war.
This ECM pod works on both air and ground threats and it was externally mounted in pods in the SU-22 aircrafts. It was internally mounted in the Mig-23BN and Mig-25RBS. It was designed to affect the missiles homing head automatically once the enemy radar had locked and launched a missile against the aircraft carrying it. No special training was required for the pilots carrying the pod since it was a defensive one. The pilot has only to select the most probable threats in priority. This type of jammer was received by the Iraqis in 1984 from the Soviet Union along with the SU-22M3 aircraft batch. It was used successfully by the SU-22 belonging to the 69 squadron during the first highly successful raid on the Iranian Island of Kharg on the 15th of August 1985, when 6 aircrafts flew over the fortified island and attacked the oil terminals and got out unscathed. The I-Hawk battery in the island did nothing to the Iraqi aircraft neither did the F-4s and F-14s patrolling its skies.
The Iraqis received their first jamming pod of the SPS-141 type early in 1981.It was designed to counter HAWK MIM-23A, since this system dealt with head on targets only the SPS-141 had a frontal antenna only. That type was less capable than the SPS-141 MVG type, and was a little bit problematic in actual deployment. The SPS-141 MVG came with the SU-22 as a complete package and there was no begging by the Iraqis, but rather a forceful demand for such equipment. That system was designed to jam the MIM23B as well as F-14, F-15, F-16 radars in the lock-on mode. The pod will affect the homing heads of the AIM-7M, F Skyflash as well as the Phoenix missiles.
The Iranian HAWK operators had no way of countering the work of the pod since they were not aware of its operation. The ECM pod affects the missile homing head after it's launched. The ground operator could do nothing about that. The Iraqis used the pod successfully from 1984 to1988. This is compared with the useless and tragic way of the Iranian use of the AN/ALQ-109 and the AN/ALQ-119 American ECM pods which the Iraqis obtained in large quantities from the Iranians when they shot their aircrafts down since September 23 1988. There was a full warehouse full of these American pods in the Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in Baghdad. Many of these pods were in good condition, some were undamaged. This shows the bad attitude of the Iranians towards the philosophy of Electronic Warfare.
Again the KH-28, AS-9 was supplied in 1982and was used operationally in late 1982 against the Iranian Hawks with a devastating effect. The missile was usually launched from a range of 70km when the launching aircraft usually a SU-22 M2 was flying at an altitude of 7km and a speed of 750km/hr. To launch the missile to a range of 100km the aircraft has to fly at an altitude of 10km. This would make the aircraft handling a little bit sluggish, something not very popular with the pilots.
The KH- 28 homing head had a very good coverage in both in azimuth certainly much better that the American HARM/HTS pod which used the same philosophy of missile/pod arrangement. The Kh-28 had a high sensitivity receiver and it could detect the HAWK illuminator sidelobes at a range exceeding 200km. However the METEL pod which has the missile firing envelope programmed in it would prevent the pilot from launching of the missile, unless the aircraft is within the firing envelope of the anti radar missile itself.
The Iraqis implemented the soviet ECM doctrine with great success. Iran was left with 3-5 HAWK batteries out of 36 originally purchased by the Shah and despite the US/Israeli support both in missiles and ground equipments well as tactics during the Iran-contra affair. The Iraqis didn’t have to employ the mass soviet tactics since they were not confronting NATO forces. The soviet doctrine calls to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the NATO HAWK batteries to open a gap in their coverage.
The Iranians started to use the mobility tactic upon the advice of the Israelis in 1986. However the Iraqis implemented a combined tactic of SEAD and conventional bombing to destroy the Iranian batteries.
I don’t know where the figure of 77 aircraft the Iraqi admitted to lose between February and March 1987 came from. This was part of the Iranian propaganda and was never said by the Iraqis. The contrary was correct. During one incident in February1987 a formation composed of four Iraqi SU-22s equipped with SPS-141 MVG were fired upon by 9 HAWK missiles from three different batteries in the south of Basra sector of the front. All 9 missiles missed their targets although the Iraqi aircrafts were flying at an altitude of 1000 meters only. The Iraqi aircraft which were carrying 6 FAB-500 bombs each bombed their target which was the Iranian infantry in that area and returned safely to base.
The KH-25MP is something entirely different from the KH-28. The principal of those missiles are entirely different. The KH-28 is an offensive weapon, while the Kh-25 is a totally defensive weapon aimed to protect the carrier aircraft.
The SPS-141 MVG was supplied by the Soviet Union and the East Germans had nothing to do with it, nor were East German experts ever utilised by the IrAF in the EW arena.
The SU-22 aircraft that tried to land near an airstrip near Dezful AB (the Iranians call it Vahdati AB) was not running out of fuel but its pilot was having some bad orientation and he figured that he was landing inside Iraq. The Iranian AAA near the strip shot him down and no aircraft or missile or pod was ever captured. The pilot ejected and returned to Iraq in 1990.
The Iraqi SEAD accompanied every attack on Iran in a continuous basis from 1984 and until August 1988. Every strike package was accompanied by SEAD elements according to the perceived Iranian threat and this led to minimise Iraqi losses to an unprecedented level. The Iraqi packages sometimes exceeded 80 fighter bombers simultaneously.
The Iranians had the MIM-23B advanced HAWK missile system, both the radar illuminator and the missiles since the seventies and so it was not new to them in 1987.
Till the end of the war Iranian AD operators never knew what hit them, whether it was KH-28or conventional bombs. They had some very good support from the Israelis and the Americans due to lack of their experience which resulted in loosing such a large amount of HAWK batteries and a very high rate of expended missiles.
The Caimen Standoff jammer was a standoff jammer against early warning radars and not the HAWK missile system. The Mirage F-1s that were carrying it flew over the Iraqi territory and never flew over Iranian territory. No Mirage F-1 carrying Caimen was ever shot down by Iranian Hawks.
In describing the events at Dezful AB, our friend Tom resorts to the usage of the highly exaggerated and extremely inflated Iranian stories about the war which has to betaken with extreme caution by any serious person. They look like dream fantasies more than real world facts.
Iraq never received or operated the Mig-25BM or Mig-25 RBT SEAD aircrafts nor did this aircraft set its foot on Iraqi soil or roamed its skies. Iraq acquired the Kh-58 only with the arrival of the SU-24 after the war. It contracted the Kh-31 but never received it. The Iraqi EW equipment and experience was more than enough in countering the deteriorating the Iranian AD as a whole.
Tom's stories about the Iranian air defence in the battle of Faw in 1986 were very far from reality, they are based upon Iranian claim stories none of which happened in actual combat. The Iranians never managed to shoot down 12 or 9 aircrafts per day. The maximum they achieved was shooting two aircrafts during one of the days. The two aircrafts were not from the same formation or package. During the battle that lasted from February9th 1986 to early April 1986 the Iranian Hawk batteries claimed more than 71 aircraft shot don by them alone. The truth was that the IrAF performed thousands of CAS and interdiction sorties with the total loss of 23 fighters only, and that was due to all type of Iranian AD.
No Iraqi TU-22 was ever sent to Kharg Island, how did the Iranians perceived the Iraqis had done so, I don’t know? Maybe the Iranians were so extensively battered and shocked that they never envisaged what hit them.
Iraq never received or operated the Mig-25BM or Mig-25 RBT SEAD aircrafts nor did this aircraft set its foot on Iraqi soil or roamed its skies. Iraq acquired the Kh-58 only with the arrival of the SU-24 after the war. It contracted the Kh-31 but never received it. The Iraqi EW equipment and experience was more than enough in countering the deteriorating the Iranian AD as a whole.
--Info from Ahmad Rushdi from Acig.org forum
This ECM pod works on both air and ground threats and it was externally mounted in pods in the SU-22 aircrafts. It was internally mounted in the Mig-23BN and Mig-25RBS. It was designed to affect the missiles homing head automatically once the enemy radar had locked and launched a missile against the aircraft carrying it. No special training was required for the pilots carrying the pod since it was a defensive one. The pilot has only to select the most probable threats in priority. This type of jammer was received by the Iraqis in 1984 from the Soviet Union along with the SU-22M3 aircraft batch. It was used successfully by the SU-22 belonging to the 69 squadron during the first highly successful raid on the Iranian Island of Kharg on the 15th of August 1985, when 6 aircrafts flew over the fortified island and attacked the oil terminals and got out unscathed. The I-Hawk battery in the island did nothing to the Iraqi aircraft neither did the F-4s and F-14s patrolling its skies.
The Iraqis received their first jamming pod of the SPS-141 type early in 1981.It was designed to counter HAWK MIM-23A, since this system dealt with head on targets only the SPS-141 had a frontal antenna only. That type was less capable than the SPS-141 MVG type, and was a little bit problematic in actual deployment. The SPS-141 MVG came with the SU-22 as a complete package and there was no begging by the Iraqis, but rather a forceful demand for such equipment. That system was designed to jam the MIM23B as well as F-14, F-15, F-16 radars in the lock-on mode. The pod will affect the homing heads of the AIM-7M, F Skyflash as well as the Phoenix missiles.
The Iranian HAWK operators had no way of countering the work of the pod since they were not aware of its operation. The ECM pod affects the missile homing head after it's launched. The ground operator could do nothing about that. The Iraqis used the pod successfully from 1984 to1988. This is compared with the useless and tragic way of the Iranian use of the AN/ALQ-109 and the AN/ALQ-119 American ECM pods which the Iraqis obtained in large quantities from the Iranians when they shot their aircrafts down since September 23 1988. There was a full warehouse full of these American pods in the Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in Baghdad. Many of these pods were in good condition, some were undamaged. This shows the bad attitude of the Iranians towards the philosophy of Electronic Warfare.
Again the KH-28, AS-9 was supplied in 1982and was used operationally in late 1982 against the Iranian Hawks with a devastating effect. The missile was usually launched from a range of 70km when the launching aircraft usually a SU-22 M2 was flying at an altitude of 7km and a speed of 750km/hr. To launch the missile to a range of 100km the aircraft has to fly at an altitude of 10km. This would make the aircraft handling a little bit sluggish, something not very popular with the pilots.
The KH- 28 homing head had a very good coverage in both in azimuth certainly much better that the American HARM/HTS pod which used the same philosophy of missile/pod arrangement. The Kh-28 had a high sensitivity receiver and it could detect the HAWK illuminator sidelobes at a range exceeding 200km. However the METEL pod which has the missile firing envelope programmed in it would prevent the pilot from launching of the missile, unless the aircraft is within the firing envelope of the anti radar missile itself.
The Iraqis implemented the soviet ECM doctrine with great success. Iran was left with 3-5 HAWK batteries out of 36 originally purchased by the Shah and despite the US/Israeli support both in missiles and ground equipments well as tactics during the Iran-contra affair. The Iraqis didn’t have to employ the mass soviet tactics since they were not confronting NATO forces. The soviet doctrine calls to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the NATO HAWK batteries to open a gap in their coverage.
The Iranians started to use the mobility tactic upon the advice of the Israelis in 1986. However the Iraqis implemented a combined tactic of SEAD and conventional bombing to destroy the Iranian batteries.
I don’t know where the figure of 77 aircraft the Iraqi admitted to lose between February and March 1987 came from. This was part of the Iranian propaganda and was never said by the Iraqis. The contrary was correct. During one incident in February1987 a formation composed of four Iraqi SU-22s equipped with SPS-141 MVG were fired upon by 9 HAWK missiles from three different batteries in the south of Basra sector of the front. All 9 missiles missed their targets although the Iraqi aircrafts were flying at an altitude of 1000 meters only. The Iraqi aircraft which were carrying 6 FAB-500 bombs each bombed their target which was the Iranian infantry in that area and returned safely to base.
The KH-25MP is something entirely different from the KH-28. The principal of those missiles are entirely different. The KH-28 is an offensive weapon, while the Kh-25 is a totally defensive weapon aimed to protect the carrier aircraft.
The SPS-141 MVG was supplied by the Soviet Union and the East Germans had nothing to do with it, nor were East German experts ever utilised by the IrAF in the EW arena.
The SU-22 aircraft that tried to land near an airstrip near Dezful AB (the Iranians call it Vahdati AB) was not running out of fuel but its pilot was having some bad orientation and he figured that he was landing inside Iraq. The Iranian AAA near the strip shot him down and no aircraft or missile or pod was ever captured. The pilot ejected and returned to Iraq in 1990.
The Iraqi SEAD accompanied every attack on Iran in a continuous basis from 1984 and until August 1988. Every strike package was accompanied by SEAD elements according to the perceived Iranian threat and this led to minimise Iraqi losses to an unprecedented level. The Iraqi packages sometimes exceeded 80 fighter bombers simultaneously.
The Iranians had the MIM-23B advanced HAWK missile system, both the radar illuminator and the missiles since the seventies and so it was not new to them in 1987.
Till the end of the war Iranian AD operators never knew what hit them, whether it was KH-28or conventional bombs. They had some very good support from the Israelis and the Americans due to lack of their experience which resulted in loosing such a large amount of HAWK batteries and a very high rate of expended missiles.
The Caimen Standoff jammer was a standoff jammer against early warning radars and not the HAWK missile system. The Mirage F-1s that were carrying it flew over the Iraqi territory and never flew over Iranian territory. No Mirage F-1 carrying Caimen was ever shot down by Iranian Hawks.
In describing the events at Dezful AB, our friend Tom resorts to the usage of the highly exaggerated and extremely inflated Iranian stories about the war which has to betaken with extreme caution by any serious person. They look like dream fantasies more than real world facts.
Iraq never received or operated the Mig-25BM or Mig-25 RBT SEAD aircrafts nor did this aircraft set its foot on Iraqi soil or roamed its skies. Iraq acquired the Kh-58 only with the arrival of the SU-24 after the war. It contracted the Kh-31 but never received it. The Iraqi EW equipment and experience was more than enough in countering the deteriorating the Iranian AD as a whole.
Tom's stories about the Iranian air defence in the battle of Faw in 1986 were very far from reality, they are based upon Iranian claim stories none of which happened in actual combat. The Iranians never managed to shoot down 12 or 9 aircrafts per day. The maximum they achieved was shooting two aircrafts during one of the days. The two aircrafts were not from the same formation or package. During the battle that lasted from February9th 1986 to early April 1986 the Iranian Hawk batteries claimed more than 71 aircraft shot don by them alone. The truth was that the IrAF performed thousands of CAS and interdiction sorties with the total loss of 23 fighters only, and that was due to all type of Iranian AD.
No Iraqi TU-22 was ever sent to Kharg Island, how did the Iranians perceived the Iraqis had done so, I don’t know? Maybe the Iranians were so extensively battered and shocked that they never envisaged what hit them.
Iraq never received or operated the Mig-25BM or Mig-25 RBT SEAD aircrafts nor did this aircraft set its foot on Iraqi soil or roamed its skies. Iraq acquired the Kh-58 only with the arrival of the SU-24 after the war. It contracted the Kh-31 but never received it. The Iraqi EW equipment and experience was more than enough in countering the deteriorating the Iranian AD as a whole.
--Info from Ahmad Rushdi from Acig.org forum
